The Supreme Court has handed down a very interesting ruling in Roper v. Simmons -

http://scotus.ap.org/scotus/03-633p.zo.pdf

- which has drawn an almost apoplectic dissenting opinion from Scalia:

http://scotus.ap.org/scotus/03-633p.zd1.pdf

I would certainly take issue with his maths, since he does not seem (in his discussion of Amish views of motor cars) to have the faintest understanding of the principles of sets and Venn drivers! I would also take exception to the thinly-veiled xenophobia evident in his distaste for the views held by the international family of which America is a member.

However, the central question he raises is one that might interest this language board: to what extent does our use of language have a fixed and certain meaning?

“The prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments, like other expansive language in the Constitution, must be interpreted according to its text, by considering history, tradition, and precedent, and with due regard for its purpose and function in the constitutional design. To implement this framework we have established the propriety and affirmed the necessity of referring to the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society to determine which punishments are so disproportionate as to be cruel and unusual.” (Kennedy plurality)

“the concept of law ordinarily signifies that particular words have a fixed meaning. Such law does not change…” (Scalia’s dissent)