Skepticism is very close to formalised incredulity


I think that's it. Even 'True Believers' are skeptical of opinions that contradict what they already know to be true. What differentiates The Skeptic from The Believer, however, is (or should be) that The Skeptic applies his skepticism even to his own views.

The first book on the subject I ever read was called Skepticism, by Arne Naess. (I'd seen a reference to it in another book called The B.S. Factor.) Skepticism doesn't appear so much a philosophy as a tool for philosophy, just as logic is a tool for philosophy. OTOH, I think the radical skepticism espoused by Sextus Empiricus that Naess describes could be viewed as a philosophy in itself. (Or maybe it's just a reason not to do philosophy - I've never been able to figure that out.) Interestingly, the radical skeptics encourage the use of language that many editors would find repellent. Instead of saying, "This is so" they recommend saying, "Such appears to be the case" or some variant thereof.

I'm not sure I'm using the technical jargon correctly, but I think David Hume (who could out-consume Schopenhauer and Hegel) is correctly labeled a radical skeptic. Hume questioned, among many other things, the justification for inductive arguments. (So you have seen thousands of crows, all of them black - that's no justification for saying there are no white crows.) I'm very fond of Popper (Objective Knowledge) who maintained Hume's answer to his original question was correct, and so reformulated Hume's question into one that had a more practical result.

For over a decade while I was studying the evolution/creation controversy, I came upon reference upon reference to Popper. Nowadays, many mainline skeptics are highly critical of him. Paul Kurtz and Martin Gardner have written articles in SI blasting him and his philosophy. For the time being, though, Popper's falsificationism makes a lot more sense to me than either Kurtz's or Gardner's criticisms.

k