Word related, in that it is composed of words - 08/03/01 06:54 PM
Below is the text of an opinion of a federal district court, sans the legal citations, which interested me because the vitriol is so rare in this context, even when well warranted:
Labor Force, Inc v Jacintoport Corp, 144 F Supp 2d 740 (SD Tex 2001)
On June 6, 2001, Defendant Jacintoport Corporation filed a Rule 12(b)(3) Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative to Transfer for Improper Venue. Defendant’s Motion contends that venue in the Galveston Division of the Southern District of Texas is improper, but that venue in the Houston Division of this Court is proper. Accordingly, Defendant seeks a dismissal or, alternatively, a transfer to the Houston Division of this Court’s Judicial District.
Manifestly, any person with even a correspondence course level understanding of federal practice and procedure would recognize that Defendant’s Motion is patently insipid, ludicrous and utterly and unequivocally without any merit whatsoever. Worse, it is just plain blatantly wrong in light of the unambiguous language of decades old federal statute and veritable mountains of case law addressing venue propriety. The federal venue statute hopelessly incorrectly interpreted and cited by Defendant provides that venue is proper in:
(1) a judicial DISTRICT ….
(emphasis added, as it is apparently needed by blithering counsel!) As the heightened letters above indicate, the venue statute speaks in terms of districts not divisions. Thus, if venue is proper in the Houston Division of the Southern District of Texas it is ipso facto proper in the Galveston Division – as well as in the Divisions of Corpus Christi, Victoria, Brownsville, McAllen and Laredo. Whether a case might be more conveniently prosecuted in one Division versus another is a question left to analysis under 28 USC 1404(a). Defendant’s obnoxiously ancient, boilerplate, inane Motion is emphatically DENIED.
Moreover, Defendant’s present counsel-of-record, Mr Eric G Carter is determined to be disqualified for cause from this action for submitting this asinine tripe. ….
Labor Force, Inc v Jacintoport Corp, 144 F Supp 2d 740 (SD Tex 2001)
On June 6, 2001, Defendant Jacintoport Corporation filed a Rule 12(b)(3) Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative to Transfer for Improper Venue. Defendant’s Motion contends that venue in the Galveston Division of the Southern District of Texas is improper, but that venue in the Houston Division of this Court is proper. Accordingly, Defendant seeks a dismissal or, alternatively, a transfer to the Houston Division of this Court’s Judicial District.
Manifestly, any person with even a correspondence course level understanding of federal practice and procedure would recognize that Defendant’s Motion is patently insipid, ludicrous and utterly and unequivocally without any merit whatsoever. Worse, it is just plain blatantly wrong in light of the unambiguous language of decades old federal statute and veritable mountains of case law addressing venue propriety. The federal venue statute hopelessly incorrectly interpreted and cited by Defendant provides that venue is proper in:
(1) a judicial DISTRICT ….
(emphasis added, as it is apparently needed by blithering counsel!) As the heightened letters above indicate, the venue statute speaks in terms of districts not divisions. Thus, if venue is proper in the Houston Division of the Southern District of Texas it is ipso facto proper in the Galveston Division – as well as in the Divisions of Corpus Christi, Victoria, Brownsville, McAllen and Laredo. Whether a case might be more conveniently prosecuted in one Division versus another is a question left to analysis under 28 USC 1404(a). Defendant’s obnoxiously ancient, boilerplate, inane Motion is emphatically DENIED.
Moreover, Defendant’s present counsel-of-record, Mr Eric G Carter is determined to be disqualified for cause from this action for submitting this asinine tripe. ….